PIOTR DUTKIEWICZ
From Tuesday’s Globe and Mail
August 26, 2008 at 7:46 AM EDT
Original article

VPO note – this article is included not just because the recent mini-war in Russia may have simply been an attempt to diffuse the stigma or America’s war for oil in Iraq, but also because (like the war in Afghanistan) it’s likely to turn out to be as much about natural gas pipelines as anything else.

Some critics have pointed to the conflict in Georgia as another example of botched Bush administration foreign policy. But, in fact, America’s real strategy was brilliantly executed, and it achieved exactly the intended outcome. Unfortunately, it’s not an outcome that makes the world a safer place.

First, it’s important to note that this dispute is not about Georgia or South Ossetia, both victims of collateral damage in geopolitical manoeuvring. It is not about Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili miscalculating the Russian response to his attack or overestimating the amount of support he would get from the West – Mr. Saakashvili is really just a colourful bit player. Nor is this entirely a case of an emboldened Russia striking back at the West for its support of Kosovo independence, or the Orange Revolution, or the Eastern European missile-defence shield, though all of these things are factors.

Simply put, this was about the U.S. depositioning the only globally significant country that consistently challenges it on foreign policy issues, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was a successful but wrongheaded attempt to undermine Russia’s global status by setting a trap into which Russia had to fall. And it was about creating a villain for U.S. domestic political reasons.

The U.S. realized that, once pushed into this corner, Russia had no choice but to respond to the Georgian attack on its lawfully present peacekeepers and on South Ossetian civilians. Not to counterattack would have put Russia in an untenable position. It could not claim to be able to protect its friends, allies and satellites from foreign intervention. It would have reverted to the Russia of 20 years ago – largely irrelevant, a nonentity.

American policy-makers knew the trap they were setting. Going back at least to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the U.S. has enforced its own “sphere of influence” policy. It knew precisely how far it had to push to provoke a reaction. Is there any way the U.S. would sit idly by if Russian-backed Cuba tried to oust U.S. forces from that island? Or if Russia built a missile-defence system in Venezuela?

The U.S. did not lose control of the hot-headed and impulsive Mr. Saakashvili. The pundits on the ground in Tbilisi have a saying: “Saakashvili doesn’t go to the bathroom without calling the U.S. embassy.” He was played masterfully by the Americans.

What country bombs its own citizens while they sleep? Would Ottawa bomb Quebec if it voted to separate? Even China, arguably one of the world’s most repressive regimes, does not bomb Tibet. The fact that Mr. Saakashvili bombed civilians in the middle of the night is a pretty good indication he doesn’t consider them citizens.

The result of Russia’s counterstrike has been exactly what the U.S. wanted. With the international community almost unanimous in its condemnation of Moscow, it no longer has the credibility to criticize the U.S. for its military adventures. And the Russian economy also sustained serious damage. Foreign investors are now delaying or cancelling projects, and the Russian stock market is paying the price. The U.S. and its tiny partner get to express their moral outrage while painting the Russian bear as expansionist.

This was a carefully developed and magnificently executed strategy. But it fails to recognize how important it is to have Russia inside the community of nations. Russia has more neighbours than any other country in the world, and many of those neighbours are nations we need to engage. The world is not a safer place without Russian involvement in the containment of nuclear proliferation. In fact, Russia plays a critical role in maintaining a dialogue with countries such as Iran that have nuclear ambitions. And Russia is an essential energy supplier to Europe, even if Europe’s long-term desire is to diminish its dependency.

Russia’s help also is essential in the war on terror. The U.S. simply cannot go it alone. But now Washington says Russian ships are no longer welcome to take part in the counterterrorism and non-proliferation operation in the Mediterranean. That helps no one.

The world needs a co-operative relationship between Russia and the U.S., one built on reciprocity. Rather than vilifying Russia, the U.S. should be engaging it as much as possible as a partner. It is not a zero-sum game. Russia does not need to be made to lose for the U.S. to win.

Piotr Dutkiewicz is a former director of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University